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THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT IN THE LAW 
OF QUASI-CONTRACT 
TIMOTHY J. SuLLIVAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The appeal of a legal rule requiring the disgorgement of gains 
unjustly acquired or retained is so compelling that scholars from 
classical times to our own era may be cited in its support.1 The 
enthusiasm for separating a wrongdoer from his illicit gains, however, 
has obscured careful analysis of what constitutes an unjust benefit 
sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to recover in quasi-contract on 
restitutionary principles.2 Not only do we lack a comprehensive 
concept of benefit, but the need to develop uniform yardsticks for 
measuring the quantum of gains unjustly obtained also has been 
neglected. 
The central function of quasi-contract in providing a remedy in 
extremis may explain why no wholly consistent or comprehensive 
definition of benefit is possible or even desirable.3 Quasi-contract fills 
many gaps in areas to which other more conventional legal actions do 
not comfortably extend4 and often provides a remedy of last resort. To 
serve these objectives the application of quasi-contract necessarily must 
be improvisational. In failing to recognize that a doctrine serving such 
divergent and exigent purposes is not likely to emerge as a model of 
rationality, courts and scholars often have confused the concept of 
*Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Williani and 
Mary; A.B., William & Mary, 1966; J.D., Harvard University, 1969. The author wishes to 
acknowledge the generous assistance of his colleague, Professor Elmer J. Schaefer, and his 
research assistant, Mr. Marc Kane, J.D., 1975, William and Mary. 
1. See J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (1951) (authorities cited as various as Pom-
ponius, a second century Roman lawyer, and the Restatement of Restitution). 
2. See Comment, Quasi-Contracts-Concept of Benefit, 46 MICH. L. REV. 543, 544 
( 1948). Relatively few articles or student comments have treated the concept of benefit as 
a distinct topic of general application. See generally Jeanblanc, Restitution under the 
Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a Legal Benefit, 26 IND. L.J. 1 (1950); Note, The 
Necessity of Conferring a Benefit For Recovery in Quasi-Contract, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1259 
(1968). 
3. See J. DAWSON, supra note 1, at 7. 
4. See Comment, supra note 2, at 551, 553-54. 
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quasi-contract. A more reasonable analysis of quasi-contract suggests 
that the doctrine simply cannot be systemized. 
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS oF QuASI-CoNTRACT 
Quasi-contract5 grew out of the common law action of general 
assumpsit, which itself was the progeny of the contract action of special 
assumpsit. 6 Prior to the development of assumpsit, the personal actions 
of covenant and debt were the principal means of enforcing contractual 
obligations. 7 The action of covenant was never used widely in the 
King's courts. 8 Debt was a much more common device for the 
enforcement of promises, although recovery in that action did not 
hinge on a showing of mutual promises; indeed, a defendant would be 
found liable in debt not because he had made a promise and failed to 
perform but because he had received a benefit and had not given the 
agreed value in return.9 
Since procedural limitations plagued the actions of covenant and 
debt, 10 lawyers sought alternative forms of action for claims that 
modern legal minds would denominate contractual. The King's courts 
showed little interest in expanding the enforceability of promises 
through liberation of these strict procedural rules, and plaintiffs' 
lawyers turned to the action of trespass on the case as a more fruitful 
5. Quasi-contract historically is a term limited in application to legal actions for there-
covery of money. Modem usage has expanded the meaning of quasi-contract to include a 
wide range of restitutionary actions both at law and in equity; this modem usage has been 
criticized, however, as misleading and historically inaccurate. See Henderson, Promises 
Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA. L. 
REv. 1115, 1135 n.88 (1971). See generally Comment, Restitution: Concepts and 
Tenns, 19 HASTINGS L.J.1167 ( 1968 ). 
6. See J. DAWSON & R. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 1 (1969). The genesis and 
maturation of quasi-contract is rooted firmly in English legal history. A detailed analysis 
of the complicated and uncertain history of quasi-contract is beyond the scope of this ar· 
ticle; other sources adequately discuss that history. See generally J. DAWSON, supra 
note I; R. GoFF & G. JoNES, RESTITUTION (1966); R. JACKSON, THE HISTORY OF QuASI-CoN· 
TRACT IN ENGLISH LAw (1936); W. KEENER, THE LAW OF QuASI-CoNTRACTS (1893); P. 
WINFIELD, QUASI-CoNTRACTS (1952). 
7. SeeS. MILSON, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CoMMON LAW 60·61 (1969). The 
actions of covenant and debt were called personal actions because they were purely private 
and of no interest to the King. To say that these actions were contractual is to impose the 
logic and classifications of our time upon a much different legal system. See id. at 211-17. 
8. See id. at 215. 
9. See id. at 224. 
10. Defects in the action of debt from the plaintiff's point of view included the defen· 
dant's right to wage his law, the requirement that the amount in issue be a sum certain, 
and the extraordinary difficulty of pleading in debt. See T. PLucKNETT, A CoNCISE 
HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAW 565·66 ( 1936). 
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alternative. Early lawyers clearly understood that a breach of a parol 
promise was a tort, 11 but only gradually did they perceive actions in 
trespass as at least partly contractual. 12 The development of the 
contractual aspects of trespass focused attention on assumpsit, which 
had its origin in trespass. .AF. actions in assumpsit became more 
common, efforts were made to make assumpsit applicable to all cases of 
simple contract to which debt applied. 13 
The first step in the development of assumpsit as a functional 
substitute for debt was the recognition "that a preexisting debt 
constituted a consideration for a promise, and therefore, if one who 
was already under an obligation enforceable by an action of debt made 
a promise to pay the debt, such action was enforceable by an action of 
assumpsit.m4 Thus, if a plaintiff could show a second promise to pay, 
subsequent to the creation of the obligation sought to be enforced, his 
action in assumpsit would be free of the disabling procedural 
impediments of debt. The decision in Slade's Case, 15 that the second 
express promise need not be shown, 16 represented the next step. The 
action created by that decision, indebitatus assumpsit or special 
assumpsit, became a remedy substantially equivalent to debt.17 
The final step in the development of quasi-contract as a relatively 
distinct legal doctrine can be traced to the opinion of Lord Mansfield in 
Moses v. Macferlan, 18 a case involving an action in indebitatus 
assumpsit. The plaintiff in Moses had endorsed notes of a third party 
over to defendant upon defendant's promise that no action would be 
commenced against the plaintiff on his endorsement. The defendant 
breached that promise, sued the plaintiff in a separate action, and 
recovered judgment. The plaintiff paid the judgment but brought an 
action against the defendant in special assumpsit.19 In awarding 
11. See Ames, TheHistoryofAssumpsit:Parti, 2HARv.L.REv.1,15(1888). 
12. See generally T. PLUCKNETI', supra note 10, at 570 (quoted exchange between 
counsel on whether trespass action sounded in tort or contract). 
13. Actions in debt were the exclusive province of the courts of common pleas. The 
judges of the King's Bench, who had jurisdiction over assumpit, thus had considerable 
incentive to permit the expansion of assumpit as an action in competition with debt. 
Assumpit developed as a contractual action in King's Bench. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 443 ( 1923); T. P!..UCKNETT, supra note 10, at 576. 
14. F. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CoNTRACTS§ 2, at 3 (1913). 
15. 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.1602). 
16. Id. 
17. Professor Ames argues that Slade's Case was not the source of indebitatus 
assumpsit; he maintains "instead that the holding of Slade's Case was the law at least 60 
years before the case was decided. See Ames, supra note 11, at 16. 
18. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.1760). 
19. Id. 
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judgment for the plaintiff, Lord Mansfield answered. the defendant's 
objections that there was no promise by observing: 
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of 
natural justice, to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this 
action, founded in the equity of the plaintiff's case, as it 
were upon a contract ("quasi ex contractu," as the Roman law 
expresses it). 20 
Lord Mansfield was the first commentator to suggest that obligations 
based upon fictional promises should be enforced. 21 
Lawyers continued to test the logical limits of the concept of 
quasi-contract. They focused principal attention on the distinction 
between actions in contract premised on a consensual agreement and 
proceedings in quasi-contract grounded in ideas of unjust enrichment.22 
As a result of this persistent probing, the doctrine of quasi-contract 
evolved into "a peculiar hybrid, a residuary remedy supplementing the 
contract and tort remedies of the common law and the wide range of 
equitable remedies."23 
The reach of quasi-contract has continued to expand; quasi-
contractual principles are applied in a wide variety of contemporary 
situations. This breadth of application has resulted in much confusion. 
One persistent source of difficulty, and the subject of this article, is the 
definition of a benefit to the defendant sufficient to entitle a plaintiff 
to recoverv 
THE MEANING OF BENEFIT 
Courts show substantial agreement that a defendant who receives a 
tangible asset has received a recoverable benefit. 24 Since 1705, in 
reliance on La mine v. Dorrell, 25 a plaintiff whose goods have been 
converted and sold may dispense with his action in tort and proceed in 
20. Id. at 678. 
21. See F. WooDWARD, supra note14,§2,at4. 
22. See J.DAWSON&R.PALMER, supra note6,at4. 
23. I d. at 4-5. 
24. See, e.g., City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 378, 394, 12 
Cal. Rptr. 701, 711 (1961) (use of electric system); Bellanca Corp. v. Bellanca, 53 Del. 378, 
383, 169 A.2d 620, 623 ( 1961) (receipt of brokerage services); Estate of Phillips, 10 Misc. 
2d 714, 716, 173 N.Y.S.2d 632, 635 (Sur. Ct. 1958) (receipt of money and labor); Bill v. 
Gattavara, 34 Wash. 2d 645, 648, 209 P .2d 457, 459 ( 1949) (receipt of cash). 
25. 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (K.B. 1705 ). 
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quasi-contract. 26 Most American courts have followed the English 
precedent and have allowed a quasi-contract action as an alternative to 
a tort action in conversion. 27 Since the existence of benefit in these 
cases usually is clear, the question of whether a benefit sufficient to 
allow recovery has been shown rarely is raised explicitly. 
The plaintiff's right to waive the tort remedy and sue in quasi-
contract has not been so obvious when the defendant converter has not 
resold the wrongfully acquired goods but instead has consumed or 
retained them. Many American jurisdictions initially rejected the right of 
a plaintiff to sue in quasi-contract where the converted goods had not 
been resold. 28 Persistent criticism by respected scholars,Z9 however, 
eventually convinced most jurisdictions to allow quasi-contractual 
recovery from a converter in the absence of resale. 30 The concepts of 
benefit expressed in the older cases denying recovery if the converter 
has not resold nevertheless provide an important starting point for an 
analysis of the status of the idea of benefit in modern cases. Two 
fundamental questions shape this analysis: whether the concept of 
benefit in earlier cases was so narrow that courts would not afford relief 
26. I d. at 303-04. The rules governing the definition of benefit in quasi-contract are iden-
tical whether the origin of the action is in contract or tort. Whether unjust enrichment 
principles should be applied uniformly to quasi-contracts arising out of a tort, an express 
contract, or an implied contract raises a broader and more controversial question. The 
more traditional view holds that quasi-contract principles constitute a body of law sep· 
arate from either tort or contract and thus are uniformly applicable to any relevant set of 
facts. Some commentators have argued in recent years, however, that quasi-contract 
actions based on the existence of an express contract should be resolved separately and 
more in accordance with conventional contract law. See Childres & Garamella, The Law 
of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in Contract, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 433, 439-40 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Childres & Garamella]; Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual 
Context, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1208, 1215-19 (1973). But cf. Dawson, Restitution or Dam-
ages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 189-90 (1959) (only benefit from analyzing quasi-contract 
actions with traditional contract action is elimination of election of remedies problems). 
27. See, e.g., Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1929); American Smelting & 
Refining Co. v. Swisshelm Gold Silver Co., 63 Ariz. 204, 210-11, 160 P.2d 757, 760 (1945); 
Canepa v. Sun Pacific Co., 126 Cal. App. 2d 706, 711, 272 P.2d 860, 864 (1954); Davidson 
Grocery Co. v. Johnston, 24 Idaho 336,342-43, 133 P. 929,930 (1913); Downs v. Finnegan, 
58Minn.112, 117, 59N.W. 981,982 (1894); Siegman v. Siegman, 155 Ore.l73, 182,62 P.2d 
16, 20 ( 1936); Ferrous Products Co. v. Gulf States Trading Co., 323 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 
App.1959). 
28. See, e.g., Crowv. Boyd, 17 Ala. 51, 54 (1849); Woodruffv. Zaban & Son, 133 Ga. 24, 
25-27, 65 S.E. 123, 123-24 (1909); Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 285, 289-90 (1827); 
Capital Garage Co. v. Powell, 96 Vt. 227, 231, 118 A. 883, 885 (1922). See general-
ly Annot.,97 A.L.R.250(1935). 
29. See F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 76, at 122-23; Corbin, Waivero{TortandSuit 
in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221,229 (1910). 
30. In a few jurisdictions the courts have not explicitly rejected the absence of resale as 
an impediment to recovery in a quasi-contract. See, e.g., Janiszewski v. Behrmann, 345 
Mich. 8, 36-39, 75 N.W.2d 77, 80-82 (1956) (dictum); McDonald v. First Nat 'I Bank, 353 Pa. 
29, 32-33,44 A.2d 265, 266 (1945); Anderson Equipment Co. v. Findley, 350 Pa. 399,401-
02,39 A.2d 520,522 (1944). 
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on restitutionary principles unless the converted goods were trans-
formed into cash; and whether the restrictions of these older cases were 
explicable on grounds unrelated to the existence or definition of 
benefit. 
Jones v. Hoar31 is the leading American decision rejecting recovery in 
quasi-contract absent a sale by the converter. The defendant in Jones 
had entered plaintiff's property and removed valuable timber. No sale 
of the timber by the defendant was shown. 32 In affirming a judgment 
for the defendant in a summary opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court approvingly referred to the trial court's opinion, which 
had cited a number of English and American decisions denying recovery 
in quasi-contract on similar facts. 33 An examination of the cases cited 
by the lower court in Jones suggests that the plaintiff was denied 
recovery for two reasons. First, courts did not clearly perceive the 
general concept of unjustified benefit as the underlying justification for 
the range of actions that we call quasi-contract. The cases extracted by 
the trial judge in Jones do not refer to the concept of benefit in the 
abstract but only to some particular manifestation of benefit such as 
money received or goods exchanged for money.34 Second, neither the 
trial nor the appellate court in Jones could find precedent for implying 
a promise from the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant 
necessary for recovery in quasi-contract. 35 Jones v. Hoar manifests a 
persistent devotion to maintaining the strict integrity of existing legal 
categories. The judges who decided the case were not philosophically 
disposed to break new ground by infusing the idea of quasi-contract 
with a concept that must have seemed dangerously flexible. 
Many of the opinions following Jones v. Hoar provide no logical 
justification for denying restitution against a converter in the absence 
of a sale of the converted goods. 36 The Missouri Supreme Court stated 
the case against recovery explicitly in Sandeen v. Kansas City, St. 
Joseph & Council Bluffs Railway Co.: 37 
The doctrine [permitting recovery in quasi-contract of the 
value of converted goods not sold by the converter] came to 
be extended by some courts to all cases in which the 
31. 22Mass. (5Pick.)285(1827). 
32. I d. at 285. 
33. I d. at 289; see id. at 285·89 (footnote)(text oflower court's opinion). 
34. Id. at 285-89 (footnote). 
35. I d. at 290. 
36. See Quimbyv. Lowell, 89 Me. 547, 549·50, 36 A. 902,903 (1907); Telford & F. Turn· 
pike Co. v. Gerhab, 9 Sad. (Pa.) 550, 553, 13 A. 90,92 (1888) (per curiam). 
37. 79 Mo. 278 (1883). 
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wrong-doer had acquired a benefit by his wrong. It was 
claimed that natural justice raised the promise upon the faith 
of the benefit received .... This extension of the doctrine 
would tend to do away with the action of tort, for perhaps in 
a majority of the wrongs inflicted the wrong-doer receives 
some benefit. 38 
7 
The court in Sandeen correctly perceived the consequences of a flexible 
definition of the benefit necessary to recovery in restitution; like the 
court in Jones, it found most compelling the impulse to preserve 
existing legal categories and salvage something of the forms of action. 39 
The cases denying recovery in quasi-contract for conversion without 
sale represent an enduring strain of judicial hostility to quasi-
contractual recovery, even in situations where the defendant has acted 
wrongly and has received a clear and tangible benefit. This judicial 
hostility results partially from the courts' distaste for the role of 
quasi-contract as a subverter of more conventional legal doctrines. No 
doubt the courts that recognized the existence of a benefit did so only 
grudgingly, because they were unable, as a matter of logic, to 
distinguish between a converter who transformed goods into cash and a 
converter who merely consumed or retained goods himself. 
Determination of the existence of benefit in cases arising out of 
actual or supposed contractual relationships follows standards sub-
stantially similar to those applicable in actions where the benefit results . 
from the defendant's tortious conversion of goods. When a breaching 
party is shown to have received a tangible benefit, courts have been 
willing to force disgorgement on quasi-contractual grounds. 40 Whether 
38. Id. at281·82. 
39. See Holt v. Mackham [1923] 1 K.B. 504. In Holt Lord Scrutton, writing in 1923, 
evidenced a similar dislike of quasi-contract because of the violence it does to established 
legal categories. Lord Scrutton observed: 
Now ever since the time when that great judge, Lord Mansfield, with no doubt a 
praiseworthy desire to free the Court from the fetters of legal rules and enable them to 
do what they thought to be right in each case ... the whole history of this particular 
form of action has been what I may call a history of well-meaning sloppiness of 
thought. 
Id. at513. 
40. Various reasons may explain why an aggrieved party chooses to sue in quasi· 
contract rather than for damages for breach of contract. See,e.g., Elder v. Chapman, 176 
Ill.142, 52 N.E.10 (1898) (gambling contract); Masseyv. Becker, 90 Ore. 461, 176 P. 425 
( 1918) (acceptance of payment after default may constitute waiver of breach); True v. J .B. 
Deeds & Son, 151 Tenn. 630, 271 S.W. 41 (1925) (subject matter jurisdiction). Where the 
plaintiff cannot establish the value of his expected losses with certainty an action in quasi-
contract becomes an attractive alternative that will permit judgment for the plaintiff. See 
Shriver v. Cook, 256 Iowa 271, 278·79, 127 N.W .2d 102, 106-07 ( 1964). Professor Corbin has 
objected to use of the term quasi-contract to describe a situation in which plaintiff seeks 
restitution instead of bringing a damage action for breach of an express contract. 5 A. 
CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1102 (1964). Corbin's view has not been adopted universally by the 
courts. See Gladowski v. Felczak, 346 Pa. 660, 663-65,31 A.2d 718, 720 (1943). 
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the defendant is a tortfeasor or a contract breacher, a showing that the 
defendant unjustly has reaped a tangible gain at the expense of the 
plaintiff usually will support recovery in quasi-contract. 
If the benefit received by the defendant is neither concrete nor 
readily quantified but incorporeal and difficult to measure, establishing 
the existence of the benefit required for quasi-contract recovery 
becomes more complicated. Phillips u. Homfray, 41 where the defendant 
had used underground passages beneath the plaintiff's property to 
transport coal, provides a starting point for analyzing the existence of 
benefit when the defendant receives a less tangible gain. The plaintiff in 
Phillips theorized that the net savings that accrued to the defendant as a 
result of his wrongful use of plaintiff's land rightfully belonged to the 
plaintiff on quasi-contractual grounds.42 The court rejected the 
argument, however, endorsing the defendant's contention that 
"[u]nless some part of the Plaintiff's property can be traced into the 
trespasser's estate, . . . his estate cannot be made liable •... "43 The 
majority reasoned that the defendant had taken nothing from the 
plaintiff merely by carrying coal underneath plaintiff's property.44 A 
dissenting judge attacked the notion that the defendant must possess 
tangible property or proceeds of property belonging to plaintiff in 
order to establish the necessary benefit and concluded that a plaintiff 
need show only that defendant saved an expenditure or that his assets 
increased because of failure to pay for the benefit received.45 
The majority opinion in Phillips reflects the restrictive view of 
benefit that plaintiff must establish that the defendant has gained 
something concrete before recovery in quasi-contract will be available. 
Other cases of the same era support this strict concept of benefit. In 
Schillinger u. United States46 the plaintiff alleged that the Government 
had realized a savings of $250,000 in laying stone on the Capitol 
grounds by using plaintiff's patented invention without compensating 
the plaintiff.47 The Supreme Court assumed that receipt of a benefit by 
the Government had been shown but nevertheless rejected plaintiff's 
41. 24Ch.D.439(1883). 
42. I d. at 439-40. 
43. I d. at 449. 
44. I d. at 462. 
45. Id. at 471 (Baggallay, L.J., dissenting). The theory that plaintiff need only show 
tnat defendant saved an expenditure or increased his assets, which Lord Justice Baggallay 
asserted as a basis for recovery, has been followed more widely in England that in the 
United States. See Gutteridge & David, The Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment, 5 CAMB. 
L.J. 204, 223·229 (1934). 
46. 155 U.S.163 (1894). 
47. Id. atl63·65. 
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claim, concluding that quasi-contract was not available absent a 
showing of a meeting of the minds.48 The Court further suggested that 
even if quasi-contract were appropriate no sufficient benefit had been 
shown, because the plaintiff had not established what property of his 
the Government had appropriated. 49 The Court thus restricted the 
concept of benefit to palpable gain; the plaintiff's assertion that 
expenses saved by the defendant constituted a cognizable benefit 
simply fell outside the definition of benefit that the court was willing 
to accept. 50 
State court decisions in the nineteenth century, frequently involving 
straying farm animals, adopted a similarly narrow view of benefit. If a 
defendant's trespassing cattle or sheep consumed the plaintiff's crop or 
pastureland, the defendant's gain was not difficult to establish since a 
measurable quantum of plaintiff's crops or pasture grass had been 
ingested. 51 The benefit to defendant becomes more obscure, however, 
where straying animals invade plaintiff's field, trampling but not 
consuming crops, even though a loss to plaintiff is self-evident. In 
Tightmeyer v. Mongold52 the defendant's cattle had trespassed on 
plaintiff's property, but plaintiff could not prove that any grass or grain 
had been consumed. 53 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the absence 
of tangible benefit to defendant was fatal to plaintiff's quasi-contract 
claim regardless of how great his loss might be. 54 That same term the 
Kansas court again rejected the opportunity to broaden the concept of 
benefit. The court's summary opinion in Fanson v. Linsley55 reflects its 
conviction that benefit in quasi-contract was not an abstract concept 
that courts could manipulate flexibly to improve a desperate 
plaintiff's chance for recovery.56 The Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire previously had rendered an opinion that depended upon an 
equally conservative definition of benefit. 57 
These American cases are united in spirit \vith the decision in Phillips 
v. Homfray. 58 Although the facts of the cases differed, each reflects an 
48. ld. at 169, 170-71. 
49. Id. at 172. 
50. Professor Woodward has criticized the narrow view of benefit endorsed in Schillin-
ger. See F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 275, at 443-445. 
51. See, e.g., Tsuboi v. Cohn, 40 Idaho 102, 107, 231 P. 708, 709-10 (1924); Gillespie v. 
Hendren, 98 Mo. App. 622, 626-27, 73 S.W. 361, 362 (1903); Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 
316,320, 326, 61 P. 863,864,866 (1900). 
52. 20 Kan. 90 (1878). 
53. I d. at 92. 
54. Id. 
55. 20 Kan. 235 (1878). 
56. See id. at 238-39. 
57. See Pagev. Babbit, 21 N.H. 389,391-92 (1850). 
58. 24 Ch. D. 439 (1883). 
10 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vo1.64:1 
implicit fear that adoption of a broader definition of benefit would 
expand the concept of quasi-contract. Like the Massachussetts court's 
decision in Jones v. Hoar, 59 these cases constituted part of an active, 
although perhaps unconscious, effort to restrict the development of 
quasi-contract. Countervailing tendencies already were exerting power-
ful pressure, but decisions like Schillinger and Tightmeyer should serve 
as reminders that the judicial expansion 9f the definition of benefit was 
not as inevitable as it now may seem. 
Although a venerable strain of American case law exists that defines 
benefit narrowly so as to preclude recovery where the plaintiff has not 
proven tangible gain by the defendant, most jurisdictions in recent 
times have developed a much broader definition of benefit. 60 The 
Vrrginia Supreme Court decision in Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball61 
typifies this recent trend. The defendant in Raven Red had acquired 
both mineral rights in plaintiff's land and an easement to construct a 
railroad to transport the coal extracted from the plaintiff's property; 
the defendant later obtained mineral rights to parcels surrounding the 
land of the plaintiff and used the railroad to transport coal mined on 
those adjoining tracts. 62 The plaintiff instituted an action in quasi-
contract to recover the benefit received by defendant from using the 
railroad to transport coal other than that mined on plaintiff's 
property. 63 The unjust benefit assertedly received by the defendant in 
Raven Red was clearly intangible; no property belonging to the plaintiff 
could be traced to defendant's hands. The gain alleged was similar to 
that rejected as a basis for recovery in Phillips v. Homfray 64 - an 
expense saved by the defendant. The court in Raven Red recognized 
that other jurisdictions had refused to find a gain on similar facts, 65 but 
affirmed plaintiff's recovery. The court reasoned: 
59. 22Mass.(5Pick.)285(1827); see notes:h-35 supra andaccompanyingtext. 
60. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 423-24, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1030·31 
(1936) (benefit from use of cavern running under plaintiff's land); Carmichael v. Old 
Straight Creek Coal Corp., 232 Ky.133, 140-42,22 S.W.2d 572, 576 (1929) (benefit from use 
of railway over plaintiff's land); DeCamp v. Bullard, 159 N.Y. 450, 454-55, 54 N.E. 26, 28 
(1899) (benefit from use of plaintiff's stream); Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 
534, 542-43, 39 S.E.2d 231, 235-36 (1946) (benefit from wrongful use of easement). See gen· 
erally Annot., 167 A.L.R. 796 ( 1947). 
61. 185 Va. 534,39 S.E.2d231 (1946). 
62. I d. at 537-38, 39 S.E.2d at 232-33. 
63. Id. at 538, 39 S.E.2d at 232-33. Recovery in quasi-contract for the value of use and 
occupancy of land traditionally has been denied in the absence of a landlord·tenant rela· 
tionship. See Lockwood v. Thunder Bay River Boom Co., 42 Mich. 536, 538·39, 4 N.W. 
292,293 (1880). The reasons for this restriction on recovery for use and occupation of land 
are mainly historical. See AMES, LECTURESONLEGALHISI'ORY 167·71 (1913). 
64. 24Ch.D.439(1883); see notes41-45 supra andaccompanyingtext. 
65. 185 Va. at 543-48, 39 S.E.2d at 235-238; see Annot., 167 A.L.R. 796, 803·05 (1947). 
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The illegal transportation of the coal in question across 
plaintiff's land was intentional, deliberate and repeated from 
time to time for a period of years. Defendant has no moral or 
legal right to enrich itself by this illegal use of plaintiff's 
property .... Natural justice plainly requires the law to imply 
a promise to pay a fair value of the benefits received. 
Defendant's estate has been enhanced by just this much. 66 
11 
The court did not distinguish between a concrete gain and an intangible 
benefit. In asserting that the fundamental question concerned whether 
the plaintiff had received an unjustified benefit, the court concluded 
that it would be illogical to deny recovery merely because the 
defendant's gain did not assume tangible form. 67 
Whether a particular court chooses to define benefit strictly or 
liberally, in order to obtain relief in quasi-contract the plaintiff must 
show receipt by the defendant of a gain that justifiably should be 
restored to the plaintiff. The phrase "unjust enrichment" presumes the 
existence of some benefit wrongfully acquired. Despite black letter 
statements that a gain must be shown to justify recovery, 68 however, a 
substantial body of cases arguably have allowed recovery in 
quasi-contract even in the absence of any demonstrable benefit to the 
defendant. 69 A long line of scholars have noted this anomalous result 
and have offered various explanations, including the theory that the 
remedy is intended primarily to restore the status quo ante. 70 Some 
66. Id. at 548, 39 S.E.2d at 238 (footnote omitted). 
67. I d. at 547, 39 S.E.2d at 237. The court in Raven Red reasoned that since the de-
fendant benefits substantially from his own wrongdoing regardless of the injury he inflicts 
on the plaintiff, an implied promise to compensate plaintiff should be found even where the 
defendant's actions do nothing to diminish the value of the plaintiff's property. I d. 
68. See RESTATEMENTOFCoNTRACTS§348,comment a, at591-92(1932). 
69. See, e.g., Williams v. Dougan, 175 Cal. App. 2d 414,415-418,346 P.2d 241, 242-44 
(1959) (plaintiff recovered monies expended on care of animals that defendant inherited 
but for which she had no concern); People's Nat1 Bank v. Magruder, 77 Fla. 235, 244-46, 
81 So. 440, 443-44 (1919) (landlord's leasehold improvements made in reliance on tenant's 
oral agreement to extend lease constitutes benefit to tenant); Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 
Mass. 247, 250-52, 88 N.E. 835, 836 (1909) (defendant received no benefit when plaintiff 
made unsuccessful business investment; recovery nevertheless allowed); Clement v. 
Rowe, 33 S.D. 499, 505-07, 146 N.W. 700, 701-02 (1914) (land transferred to third party at 
defendant's direction); Abrams v. Financial Serv. Co., 13 Utah 2d 343, 346, 374 P.2d 309, 
311 (1962) (prospective buyer gained nothing from home improvements since sale was not 
finalized, but seller allowed recovery); cf. Campbell v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 421 
F.2d 293, 294·97 (5th Cir. 1969) (since valuation of benefit difficult, fair marliet value of 
services or products used to determine plaintiff's recovery); Maragos v. City of Minot, 191 
N.W.2d 570, 572 (N.D. 1971) (dictum) (inverse condemnation proceeding; recovery avail-
able on implied contract theory despite absence of benefit to Government). 
70. See D. DOBBS, THE LAw OF REMEDIES 792 (1973); Childres & Garamella at 436-37; 
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 394 
(1937); Henderson, supra note 5, at 1147; Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Un-
just Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. REV. 223, 230 (1936); Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Con· 
text, 73 CoLUM. L. REV.1208, 1219·1226 ( 1973). 
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commentators have maintained that quasi-contract served as a 
respectable disguise for the award of reliance damages before courts 
recognized reliance losses as an appropriate basis for measuring recovery 
in breach of contract actions;71 another asserts that courts in deciding 
cases that arise from the breach of personal service contracts have 
dispensed with the requirement that a benefit be shown simply to 
protect the legitimate interests of plaintiffs who might go uncom-
pensated otherwise. 72 'One commentator unreasonably ascribes the 
recovery of damages without requiring a showing of gain to judicial 
ignorance of elementary distinctions in the law of quasi-contract. 73 
Whatever the correct explanation of this trend may be, any inquiry into 
the definition of benefit must account for those cases ostensibly 
decided on quasi-contractual grounds that permit recovery without 
requiring a finding of gain. 
The clear preference of American courts in this century has been to 
relax and in some instances to dispense with the requirement that 
benefit be shown before quasi-contractual recovery is allowed. In this 
judicial environment, the definition of benefit has varied depending 
upon the exigencies of a particular case. Some courts consider benefit 
to be any net gain measurable in monetary terms. 74 Other courts have 
refused to eliminate explicitly the requirement that a benefit be proved 
but nonetheless have found the necessary benefit on facts establishing a 
most tenuous gain. 75 The Restatement of Restitution also specifically 
71. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 70, at 393-94. 
72. Note, supra note 2, at 1267. Personal service contracts raise significantly different 
problems in the determination of unjust gain than do contracts for the sale of goods or 
other tangible property. See REsrATEMENT OF REsriTUTION § 40 & comment a, at 155 
( 1937); Childres & Garamella at 451. 
73. See 1970 DUKE L.J. 573, 581·82. The author criticizes the Fifth Circuit for its de-
cision in CampbeU v. Tennessee VaUey Authority, in which the court permitted recovery 
in quasi-contract measured by the market value of plaintiff's services in preparing 
microfilms rather than by the value received by the defendant. I d.; see 421 F.2d 293, 294· 
97 (5th Cir. 1969). The author attributes the court's decision to its failure to distinguish 
between contracts implied in law and contracts implied in fact. See 1970 DuKE L.J. at 
581·82. The author fails to perceive, however, that the fundamental and threshold problem 
raised by CampbeU is not the proper standard for measuring benefit, but instead whether 
the defendant received any benefit at all. See 421 F .2d at 298 (Rives, J ., dissenting). 
74. See Ablah v. Eyman, 188 Kan. 665, 678·79, 365 P.2d 181, 191-92 (1961); Indepen· 
dent Electric Lighting Corp. v. M. Brodsky & Co., 118 Misc. 561, 563, 194 N.Y.S.1, 2 (Sup. 
Ct.1972). 
75. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F .2d 586, 592-93 (5th Cir. 1957) 
(unsuccessful exploration for mineral deposits); H.W. Kastor & Sons Adv. Co. v. Grove 
Labs., 58 F. Supp. 1011, 1016·17 (E.D. Mo. 1945) (unsuccessful advertising campaign); 
Meyer v. Parobek, 119 Cal. App. 2d 509, 511-12, 259 P.2d 948, 950·51 (1953) (sale of assets 
in bankruptcy to satisfy creditors); Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 41 Utah 404, 407.08, 
125 P. 860, 861·62 (1912) (advertising benefits where defendant ceased operation). Some 
courts have arrived at a more restrictive view of benefit. See General Metals, Inc. v. 
Green Fuel Economizer Co., 213 F. Supp. 641, 652 (D. Md. 1963); Tramonte v. A.J. 
Rasmussen & Sons, 167 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). 
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sanctions recovery on unjust enrichment principles for the preservation 
of life and health even though the measurement of longer life or better 
health cannot be translated easily into dollar amounts. 76 A substantial 
body of case law similarly supports recovery in quasi-contract for the 
wrongful use of plaintiff's ideas,77 even though the precise measure-
ment of defendant's gain in such cases often has proved difficult.78 
Procedural reforms, such as the adoption of Field Codes and the 
growing influence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, also have 
contributed to the expansion of the concept of benefit. By eroding the 
restrictive influence of the common law forms of action, these reforms 
have freed courts from excessive concern over whether a 
quasi-contractual remedy conflicts with the theory of plaintiff's 
action. 79 'Result-oriented courts therefore may have expanded the 
concept of benefit without any intellectual direction. 
76. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 116 (1937); see Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 
605-08, 104 S.W. 164, 165-66 (1907); In re Crisan's Estate, 362 Mich. 569, 574·76, 107 
N.W.2d 907, 910·11 (1961). 
77. See, e.g., Servo Corp. v. General Electric Co., 337 F.2d 716, 722-25 (4th Cir. 1964); 
Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1953); DeFillips v. Chrysler 
Corp., 53 F. Supp. 977, 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Liggett & Myer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 
Ind. App. 420, 429-431, 194 N.E. 206, 210 (1935). See generally Havighurst, The Right to 
Compensation for an Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 295 (1954); Annot., 170 A.L.R. 449 (1947). 
78. See Sheldon v. Metro·Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 403-05 (1940); Havig-
hurst, supra note 77, at 299·300. 
79. See Murphy v. Lifschitz, 49 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440-42 (Sup. Ct. 1944), affd 294 N.Y. 
892, 63 N.E.2d 26 (1945) (per curiam). The plaintiff in Murphy, a purchaser of liquor 
under a sales contract, brought an action for specific performance or, alternatively, da-
mages after defendant seller failed to deliver the contract goods. Id. at 440. Defendant 
had sold the subject liquor in the black market at a price substantially above the contract 
price. Id. Finding no basis for awarding plaintiff a substantial recovery on a breach of 
contract theory, the court instead awarded plaintiff recovery measured by defendant's 
profit: the difference between contract price and black market price. Id. at 441-42. The 
court evidenced no discomfort in awarding relief measured by a quasi-contract standard 
even though the plaintiff's action had been brought on the contract. 
The trend toward a liberal definition of benefit has not been without negative impact; 
flexible definitions of benefit have further confused the muddled meaning of benefit and 
have exacerbated the difficulty of framing damage awards in quasi-contract. The good 
samaritan cases involving physicians illustrate the difficulty of determining damages 
under a broad definition of benefit. The plaintiff physician may properly persuade the 
court that defendant's improved health is a sufficient benefit to justify a recovery, but ar· 
ticulation of a rational and consistent monetary standard that could be used to measure 
the value of defendant's improved health is quite difficult. See Comment, supra note 2, at 
545. Courts that have awarded recovery in these good samaritan cases measure the dam· 
ages by the value of plaintiff's services rather than the benefit conferred on the defendant. 
See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 606-07, 104 S.W. 164, 166 (1907); Ladd v. Witte, 116 
Wis. 35, 40,92 N.W. 365,367 (1902). This measure of recovery conflicts with the theory of 
the action, however, which asserts that the defendant has received an unjustified benefit. 
To award recovery measured by the value of plaintiff's services without inquiring into 
whether the value approximates defendant's unjust gain may be the only convenient basis 
for measuring the award; it nevertheless begs the question confronting the court in quasi· 
contract actions. Although plaintiff's recovery historically has been measured by the value 
of his services and not their value to the defendant, application of this general rule does not 
answer the argument that courts should consider the defendant's gain; in quantum meruit 
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THE CHILDRES-GARAMELLA HYPOTHESIS: 
A RATIONAL CoNTROL MEcHANISM? 
Against this background of ongoing judicial redefinition of benefit, 
Robert Childres and Jack Garamella published a major article setting 
forth an analytical framework within which quasi-contract actions 
properly may be confined. 8° Childres and Garamella do not discuss 
specifically the concept of benefit as an idea common to the wide range 
of quasi-contract actions but limit the applicability of their theory to 
suits growing out of express contracts. Observing that quasi-contract 
principles have been overly utilized, 81 the authors contend that a clear 
distinction should be made between quasi-contract actions where an 
actual benefit is conferred and those actions to recover the reasonable 
value of expenses and services; Childres and Garamella argue that only 
the former situation presents an appropriate setting for the application 
of unjust enrichment theory.82 The "reasonable value" cases, long 
assumed to be based upon unjust enrichment principles, are simply 
reliance damage actions. 83 
The factual distinction between "actual benefit" and "reasonable 
value" cases may be simply illustrated. Assume A contracts 'vith B to 
sell a new automobile to B for $3,000. B gives A his check for the 
$3,000 purchase price, but A refuses to deliver the promised auto-
actions the plaintiff's services ordinarily are requested, but in good samaritan cases the de-
fendant frequently makes no such request. See Edson v. Hammond, 142 App. Div. 693, 
696, 127 N.Y.S. 359, 360 (1911). See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 113, com· 
ment g, at 473-74 ( 1937) (appropriate measure of damage in good samaritan cases is value 
of plaintiff's services). 
Some courts have held that a plaintiff's recovery cannot be limited to nominal damages 
simply because it is difficult to assign a monetary value to an intangible benefit. See Shell 
Petroleum Corp. v. Scully, 71 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1934) (unauthorized exploration for 
minerals; recovery not limited to nominal damages despite difficulties of measuring bene-
fit); Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 427·28, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1031·33 (1936) (tres· 
pass on cavern partially beneath plaintiff's property; plaintiff entitled to one-third of net 
profits of tourist enterprise where benefit difficult to apportion). See also Humble Oil & 
Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190, 191 (Tex. Comm. Civ. App. 1925), modified andre· 
manded, 291 S.W. 538 (1927) (recovery cannot be limited to nominal damages because of 
uncertainty of defendant's benefit from unauthorized drilling on plaintiff's property), 
80. See Childres & Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in 
Contract, 64 Nw. U .L. REv. 433 ( 1969) [hereinafter cited as Childres & Garamella]. 
81. See id. at 444. 
82. I d. at 435·36. 
83. Id. at 437-39, 457. See also Fuller & Perdue (parts 1 & 2), supra note 83, at 52, 
373. Fuller and Perdue identify three interests that courts have recognized-explicitly or 
implicitly-when awarding contract damages: a restitution interest, which describes the 
claim of a promisee who has conferred some value on the promisor in reliance on the 
contract; a reliance interest, which is premised on the promisee's claim to expenses 
incurred in reliance on the contract but that have not benefitted the promisor; and an 
expectancy interest, which reflects the promisee's claim to the value that the breaching 
party's promise represents. I d. at 53-54. 
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mobile. Since A has been enriched tangibly to the extent of $3,000, an 
action in quasi-contract to compel disgorgement of A's unjustified gain 
would properly lie. According to the Childres-Garamella hypothesis, 
this fact pattern presents a case of "actual enrichment." Assume next 
that A agrees to custom build an automobile for B at a contract price of 
$10,000. A purchases the necessary materials at a cost of $5,000 and 
hires an assistant at a salary of $1,500. The materials prove unsuitable, 
however, and the assistant is incompetent; A therefore discards the 
materials, discharges his assistant, purchases new materials at a cost of 
$6,000, and engages a new assistant at a salary of $1,800. As work on 
the automobile begins anew, B repudiates the contract. A brings an 
action to recover $15,000 representing the cost of materials, the salary 
expense of his assistants, and the value of his own labor. This fact 
pattern presents a "reasonable value" case in which reliance, rather than 
quasi-contract principles, should. apply. 
Childres and Garamella's analysis also addresses the question of 
whether an aggrieved party suing in quasi-contract after part per-
formance can recover only according to the underlying contract rate. 84 
The question of when and to what extent recovery should be allowed in 
excess of the contract rate relates directly to the concept of benefit in 
quasi-contract, since courts implicitly must determine the extent of the 
defendant's benefit in deciding whether recovery should exceed the 
contract rate. 85 · Childres and Garamella propose no solution to this 
question, concluding only that recovery should be limited to the 
contract rate in some cases and not in others. 86 The authors do suggest 
some guidelines for distinguishing between these two types of cases. 
Suppose A contracts to supply B with 100 rifles at a unit cost of $100. 
A delivers the first 30 rifles but at a unit cost of $300. B then 
repudiates the agreement, and A sues in quasi-contract for $9,000- the 
cost of manufacturing the rifles. 87 Under the Childres-Garamella 
84. See W. KEENER, supra note 6, at 289; F. WooDWARD, supra note 14, § 268, at 430· 
31. The great majority of American courts have permitted recovery in quasi-contract in 
excess of the contract price. See, e.g., Southern Painting Co. v. United States, 222 F .2d 
431, 433-34 (lOth Cir. 1955); Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 578 (Cal. Dist. App. 1933); 
Heitz v. Sayers, 32 Del. 207, 218-20, 121 A. 225,230-31 (1923). See generally Palmer, The 
Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 264 
(1959). Only a few jurisdictions have denied recovery in excess of the contract 
rate. See Kehoev. Mayor & Common Council, 56 N.J.L. 23,26-27,27 A. 912,913 (Sup. Ct. 
1893); Doolittle & Chamberlain v. McCullough, 12 Ohio St. 360, 365-67 (1861). 
85. See Childres&Garamellaat446-47. 
86. Id. at 457-58. 
87. See Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1965), 
rev 'don other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 ( 1966) (restitution available on similar facts; remand 
to determine why costs exceeded contract rate). 
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analysis, whether A may recover more than the $3,000 contract price 
depends on why the expenses incurred by A exceeded the contract rate. 
Courts should permit recovery in excess of the contract rate where the 
additional costs were incurred not because of A's inefficient operation 
but because the "real" value of the rifles when completed and delivered 
exceeded the contract price. Such recovery should be allowed because 
A is not casting the additional cost of his incompetence on the 
defendant but rather seeks to obtain only a return of the increment of 
"real" value above the contract price unjustly received by B.88 
The Childres-Garamella hypothesis has major implications for the law 
of quasi-contract and the concept of benefit. By narrowly defining 
benefit to include only cases in which the defendant can be shown to 
have obtained "real" gain, the authors' theory contracts the area of the 
law to which unjust enrichment principles should apply.89 This narrow 
definition of benefit excludes from the ambit of quasi-contract law 
innumerable cases that traditionally have been decided by applying 
quasi-contract concepts. 90 ' In arguing that cases growing out of an 
explicitly contractual setting are more appropriately decided on 
reliance theory, Childres and Garamella inject a useful control 
mechanism into the law of quasi-contract by which the outer limits of 
the remedy may be more rationally defined. 
The Childres-Garamella hypothesis is not without defects. By 
limiting their inquiry to quasi-contract actions arising out of actual 
contractual relations,91 the authors do not analyze directly the 
multitude of quasi-contract actions that arise in tort or that do not 
depend on any underlying express contract. The tangled history of 
quasi-contract and its broad application militate against such a 
compartmentalization of the doctrine into neat, self-contained 
segments. Quasi-contract resulted from the need to supplement a 
variety of tort and implied contract remedies and has developed 
without sharp distinctions based on the origin of the action. Childres 
and Garamella may be correct in objecting to such imprecision as the 
88. Under the Childres-Garamella analysis, A could recover costs in excess of the 
contract rate even if they did not represent a "real" increase in value of the rifle to the 
extent that his additional expense represented startup costs that increased the production 
costs of earlier units. See Childres & Garamella at 445. 
89. See id. at 443. 
90. See Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1965), 
rev 'don other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966) (non-defaulting plaintiff recovers reasonable 
cost of performance); Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 578 (Cal. Dist. App. 1933) (plaintiff 
recovers cost of performance less inefficiency loss). 
91. See Childres & Garamella at 433-37. 
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root of much confused thinking about quasi-contract, but the history 
and purposes of the action cannot be ignored. 92 
Childres and Garamella's fundamental distinction between actions in 
which the plaintiff seeks to recover "real" enrichment or gain and those 
in which the plaintiff seeks to recover the "reasonable value" of his 
effort also raises difficulties. The authors themselves observe that the 
Restatement of Restitution does not recognize the distinction between 
cases of "real gain" and "reasonable value. " 93 They also concede 
indirectly that a substantial body of case law relevant to their 
hypothesis yields no explicit recognition of the theory they assert. 94 
Although the distinction between "real gain" and "reasonable value" is 
valid in the sense that those co~cepts represent very different means of 
measuring recovery in restitution,95 no other established scholar in the 
field has based a comprehensive analysis of quasi-contract on that 
distinction. In arguing that this distinction provides a rationalizing 
principle that will allow the orderly classification of a vast body of 
quasi-contract cases, Childres and Garamella move well beyond current 
thinking.96 
In criticizing courts for awarding a restitution recovery in excess of 
the contract rate, the authors assert that any rational measurement of 
damages in restitution should reflect, to the maximum extent possible, 
the allocation of risks agreed upon by the parties themselves in their 
contract. 97 'Although Childres and Garamella claim that their approach 
will preserve the parties' respective positions under the contract, the 
risks allocated by the parties to control the amount of a recovery in 
quasi-contract actually do not determine recovery under the Childres-
Garamella formula. For example, assume that a manufacturer contracts 
to sell tanks to the Government at $10,000 each, that the Government 
repudiates, and that the plaintiff proves that the cost of manufacturing 
each tank delivered before breach was $20,000. Under the Childres-
92. Professor Dawson has observed correctly that "we can probably say now that 
damage remedies can be ignored and quasi-contract used as to any kind of legal wrong 
from which gains are realized." J. DAWSON, supra note 1, at 23. A remedy that is so 
broadly based and that has so many potential applications cannot be compartmentalized 
satisfactorily in the manner Childres and Garamella suggest. 
93. Childres & Garamella at 436; see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 149 ( 1937). 
94. See Childres & Garamella at 435·36. 
95. See 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 40, § 1113; Note, Contracts: Remedies for Total 
Breach of Contract: Restitution and ''Damages," 43 CoRNELL L. REV. 274, 279 ( 1957). 
96. Childres and Garamella suggest that other commentators may not have suggested 
their hypothesis earlier because certain legal concepts vital to an understanding of the 
larger theory, such as the reliance interest or restitution itself, are of relatively recent 
origin. See Childres & Gar amelia at 433-34. 
97. Id. at 446. 
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Garamella hypothesis, recovery nonetheless \vould be limited to the 
contract rate of $10,000; recovery in excess of the contract rate would 
not be allowed because the plaintiff must not be permitted to shift its 
contractual loss to the Government where the loss is caused by its own 
ineffectiveness. If the plaintiff can show that the tanks have a "real" 
value of $15,000 each, however, the Childres-Garamella approach 
would entitle the manufacturer to $15,000 for each tank delivered.98 
Assume next that the tanks have a "real" value 50 percent greater 
than the contract price because the cost of steel increased substantially 
between the date of contract and the date of breach. In fixing the price 
of tanks at $10,000 with no provision for upward adjustment if the 
cost of materials increased, the parties presumably allocated the risk of 
higher material costs to the plaintiff. In an ordinary contract action, 
absent breach by the Government, the plaintiff would be unable, 
except under extraordinary circumstances, to recover the additional 
cost of steel. 99 The Childres-Garamella hypothesis would allow recovery 
of the "real" value of the tanks, however, presumably reflecting the 
increased costs of steel. Childres and Garamella recognize this incon-
sistency in their thesis but urge that the analogy to cases in which the 
breaching party receives money and is required to disgorge that gain is 
too close to arrive at any different result where the "real" value of the 
goods the defendant receives exceeds the contract rate.100 In presenting 
their hypothesis the authors should at least explain more fully why in 
some cases the allocation of risks should be shifted radically from that 
provided for by the parties. In these cases Childres and Garamella 
abandon the basic assumption of their analysis that recovery should be 
based on the allocation of risks agreed on by the parties. Ironically, the 
authors cast aside this assumption because of precedent-courts always 
have given restitution in cases of actual enrichment without reference 
to the contract rate101 -a reason they condemn elsewhere as the cause 
of much muddled thinking in the area of quasi-contract. The 
Childres-Garamella position forces the conclusion that the defendant in 
the preceeding example should pay $15,000 per tank despite the lower 
contract price only because the defendant is a bad man and deserves 
punishment for breaking the contract. 102 
98. See id. at 443. 
99. See UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-615, comment 4; 6 A. CoRBIN, supra note 40, 
§1333. 
100. See Childres & Garamella at 443. 
101. Seeid. 
102. Despite the natural conclusion of their hypothesis, Childres and Garamella term 
the use of the bad man standard for measuring contract damages "nonsense." See id. 
at435. 
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The greatest failing of the Childres-Garamella analysis may be its 
assumption that the plaintiff can easily prove the fundamental 
economic distinctions necessary to proper application of the Childres-
Garamella test. The existence of rules distinguishing between costs that 
are attributable to plaintiff's inefficiency and those that confer "real" 
benefits on the defendant, of course, would be useful for measuring 
recovery in quasi-contract. Cases are tried and decided, however, by 
judges, lawyers, and juries wholly unskilled in economic analysis.103 
Moreover, economists concede that the measurement of the economic 
efficiency of a particular production process presents many difficulties. 
Although the concept of inefficiency theoretically may not be difficult 
to grasp, the precise measurement of the inefficiency of a particular 
production process is not a simple task. One crucial factor in that 
measuring process, for example, is the potential gain in efficiency that 
would result if the plaintiff had made better use of scale economies. 104 
The accurate measurement of economic efficiency must account for 
factors such as planning, designing, and organizing, which are not easily 
quantified.105 Furthermore, the performance of a single contract that is 
the subject of litigation may provide an inaccurate measurement of 
efficiency.106 Finally, costs of production may yield precious little 
information about the efficiency of plaintiff's manufacturing operation 
absent a comparison of plaintiff's operations with those of similar 
firms. Such comparative studies multiply the variables relevant to 
determining what part of plaintiff's costs result from his inef-
ficiency.107 
The application of the Childres-Garamella hypothesis even in the 
simple case would require considerable economic expertise. Modem 
quasi-contract claims often arise in complicated litigation involving 
substantial sums of money and a multitude of second and third tier 
subcontractors. 108 The proper application of Childres and Garamella's 
103. Legal scholars have shown a growing interest in the relationship between law and 
economics. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); Leff, Econo-
mic Analysis of Law: SomeRealismAboutNominalism, 60VA. L. REV. 451 (1974). 
104. Scale economics are defined as "reductions in cost per unit of product manufac-
tured and sold associated with the operation of large as compared to small production, 
distribution, and merchandising." Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentra-
tion, in IDUSTRIAL CoNCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING 16 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, & 
J. Westoneds.1974). 
105. See McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Scale, in INDUSTRIAL CoNCENTRATION: 
THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 104, at 65. See generally id. at 65·88. 
106. See id. at 58·59. 
107. See id. at 61·65. 
108. See Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 535-36 (Ct. Cl. 1965), 
rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966); General Metals, Inc. v. Green Fuel Econo· 
mizer Co., 213 F. Supp. 641,642-43 (D. Md.1963). 
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theory to such cases would enmesh the court in a morass of conflicting 
economic evidence further complicating litigation that is already 
sufficiently perplexing.109 One reason courts frequently remedy 
defendant's unjust benefit by awarding plaintiff his reliance or out of 
pocket losses is because the task of quantifying benefit is not a practical 
alternative. 
Although Childres and Garamella bring some measure of order to this 
muddled area of the law, the authors attempt to push their reasoning 
too far. Modem courts and scholars still view quasi-contract as a 
doctrine to be pressed into service when the application of more 
conventional doctrines would not yield a result that is compelled by 
natural justice.110 The power of scholarship to impose order in this 
field seems more limited than Childres and Garamella are willing to 
concede. 
Is BENEFIT ENouGH? 
MORAL POSTURE OF THE PLAINTIFF 
Professor Woodward defines quasi-contracts as "legal obligations 
arising ... from the receipt of a benefit the retention of which is 
unjust, and requiring the obligor to make restitution."111 As this 
observation suggests, the plaintiff must show not only that the benefit 
received by the defendant is legally sufficient but also that retention of 
the benefit by defendant at the expense of the plaintiff is unjust. The 
moral posture of the plaintiff-the "justice" of his claim-thus 
becomes important to the success of his action. 112 If the quasi-contract 
action arises out of tort, the defendant is by definition the wrongdoer 
and the plaintiff has the superior moral position. In quasi-contract cases 
109. See Childres & Burgess, Seller's Remedies: The Primacy of UCC 2·708(2), 48 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 833, 847 (1973) (recognition by Professor Childres of limitations of 
economic analysis). 
110. See Coleman Engineering Co. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 396, 410, 55 
Cal. Rptr. 1, 11,420 P.2d 713, 723 (1966) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting); Dyer Constr. Co. v. 
Elias Constr. Co., 287 N.E.2d 262,264 (Ind. 1972); Clark v. Peoples Sav. &Loan Ass'n, 221 
Ind. 168, 172, 46 N.E.2d 681, 682 (1943); J. DAWSON, supra note 1, at 8; 
Note, supra note 2, at 1267. Quasi-contract frequently has been utilized where the plain· 
tiff's argument is not supported by more traditional concepts of recovery. See Minsky's 
Follies, Inc. v. Sennes, 206 F.2d 1, 2·3 (5th Cir. 1953) (plaintiff incurred great cost in expec• 
tation of sale). See also Fildew v. Besley, 42 Mich. 100, 101, ·3 N.W. 278, 279 (1879) 
(dictum) (fire destroyed structure before completion; quasi·contract supplements tradi· 
tional contract concepts but recovery denied). 
111. F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 2, at 4. 
112. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Introductory Note §§ 150·159, at 596 (1937) 
(moral position of plaintiff a factor in measuring extent of plaintiff's recovery). See gen· 
erally Childres & Garamella at 443; 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 40, § 1112. 
1975] QUASI-CONTRACf 21 
arising from express contracts, the problem of assigning moral fault also 
presents no difficulty since the defendant usually has breached. 
Complications arise, however, where the plaintiff has breached an 
express contract but attempts to establish that retention by the 
defendant of an aclmowledged benefit is unjust because the value of the 
plaintiff's performance exceeds the damages inflicted by his breach.U3 
The inflexible application of a rule broadly denying the right to 
recovery to defaulting plaintiffs would produce many harsh results. 114 
Many courts avoid harsh results by refusing to follow the rule denying 
plaintiff's right to recovery.115 In other jurisdictions that purport to 
follow the harsh majority rule, judges have devised legal fictions to 
permit plaintiff's recovery without explicitly overruling earlier cases.U 6 
The majority rule denying recovery to defaulting plaintiffs despite a 
net benefit to defendant received its first authoritative expression in 
Stark u. Parker. 117 The plaintiff in Stark had agreed to work for 
defendant for a year with his compensation payable at the end of the 
term. The plaintiff without legal excuse left defendant's employ before 
the expiration of the contract but brought suit in quasi-contract to 
recover the value of the services that he had rendered prior to the 
breach.118 Plaintiff's counsel argued that plaintiff should recover in 
quantum meruit conceding that the defendant's damages from the 
breach should be deducted from plaintiff's recovery; the court, 
however, refused recovery altogether.119 'Writing for the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justice Lincoln flatly rejected the idea 
"that a party who deliberately • . . enters into an engagement and 
113. See, e.g., Varnerv. Hardy, 209 Ala. 575, 575-76, 96 So. 860,861-62 (1923); Fritts v. 
Quinton, 118 Kan. 111, 112·13, 233 P. 1036, 1037-38 (1925); Waite v. C.E. Shoemaker & 
Co., 50 Mont. 264,274-75, 146 P. 736, 738 (1915); Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 356, 
384 P.2d 396,397 (1963). See generally Lee,PlaintiffinDefault, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1023, 
1025·27 ( 1966). 
114. Application of the rule denying recovery to defaulting plaintiffs penalizes most 
severely the plaintiff who has rendered a major part of his promised performance. 
See Freedinan v. Rector, Warden & Vestrymen, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 22,230 P.2d 629, 632 ( 1951). 
115. See, e.g., Porter v. Whitlock, 142 Iowa 66, 68·69, 120 N.W. 649, 650 (1909); 
McKnight v. Bertram Heating & Plumbing Co., 65 Kan. 859, 70 P. 345, 346 (1902) (per 
curiam) (en bane) (opinion not contained in official reporter); Miles Homes, Inc. v. 
Starrett, 23 Wis. 2d 356, 360·61, 127 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1964). 
116. See Joachim v. Andover Silver Co., 104 N.H. 18, 21, 177 A.2d 394, 396 (1962) 
(plaintiffrecovers for fully performed divisible portion); Chaude v. Shepard, 122 N.Y. 397, 
401..()2, 25 N .E. 358, 360 ( 1890) (recovery based on distinction between payments to ensure 
performance and payments on the contract). 
117. 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 267 (1824). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 268. 
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voluntarily breaks it . . . should be permitted to make that very 
engagement the foundation of a claim to compensation for services 
under it."120 Emphasizing its moral outrage with the plaintiff's 
actions, 121 the court failed to distinguish between a suit on the 
contract and a suit in quasi-contract based on the concept of unjust 
enrichment.122 
Several courts have qualified the rule in Stark by attempting to 
distinguish between a defaulting plaintiff who willfully breaches 
without excuse and one whose breach is non-willful.123 Such 
distinctions are often difficult to make, however, and frequently 
amount to little more than a particular appellate court's subjective 
intuition.124 In continuing to deny defaulting plaintiffs recovery, other 
courts have not cited the plaintiff's moral fault but have reasoned that 
the benefit conferred on the defendant did not exceed the harm caused 
by the breach.125 The computation of net gain or loss when the 
plaintiff has defaulted, however, sometimes owes more to plaintiff's 
status as a legal "sinner" than to the rules of mathematics.126 
A long line of authority rejects the rule of Stark. In Britton v. 
Turner, 127 on facts almost identical to those in Stark, a defaulting 
plaintiff gained recovery in quasi-contract despite his acknowledged 
default.128 'Focusing on the unjust enrichment accruing to a defendant 
who receives a net gain, 129 'the court discounted the rationale in Stark 
as "technical reasoning" that obscured the central issue= the defendant 
received beneficial services but paid no compensation.130 More recent 
cases adopting the Britton rule have added little by way of further 
analysis; most cases emphasize the defendant's unjust enrichment in 
granting recovery despite the plaintiff's status as a defaulting party.131 
120. Id. at 271. 
121. See id. at 275 ("the laborer is worthy of his hire, only upon the performance of his 
contract, and as the reward of his fidelity"). 
122. See id. at 272-73. See also Lee, supra note 113, at 1024. 
123. See Harris v. The Cecil N. Bean, 197 F.2d 919, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1952); Begovich v. 
Murphy, 359 Mich.156, 159,101 N.W. 2d 278,280 (1960); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS§ 
357(1932). 
124. See 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 40, § 1123. 
125. See Kitchin v. Mori, 84 Nev. 181, 183·84, 437 P.2d 865, 866 (1968); Dluge v. 
Whiteson, 292 Pa. 334, 335-36, 141 A. 230, 231 ( 1928). 
126. See Newcombv. Ray, 99 N.H. 463,467-68, 114 A.2d 882,884-85 (1955). 
127. 6N.H.481 (1834). 
128. Id. at 482, 485-86. In Britton the plaintiff, who had contracted with the defen-
dant to perform services, left the defendant's service before the contract was fully per-
formed and without the defendant's consent. Id. at 482. Plaintiff sued, asking to be com· 
pensated in quantum meruit for services performed. I d. 
129. Id. at 487. 
130. Id. at 493. 
131. See, e.g., Caplan v. Schroeder, 56 Cal. 2d 515, 518-21, 364 P.2d 321, 324, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 145, 148 (1961); Loeffler v. Wilcox, 132 Colo. 449, 453, 289 P.2d 902, 904 (1955); 
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THE PLU8-MINUS FACTOR 
Keener and Woodward maintain that the plaintiff must prove both 
that the defendant has committed a wrong and that the defendant has 
benefitted at the expense of the plaintiff: "the facts must show not 
only a plus, but a minus quality."132 Since the idea that the defendant 
should not be entitled to retain a .benefit wrongfully obtained at 
plaintiff's expense partially underlies quasi-contract, the Keener-
Woodward view makes some sense. If the defendant's gain cannot be 
shown to have caused plaintiff a loss, no basis exists for permitting 
recovery in quasi-contract. 
Despite the Keener-Woodward conclusion that quasi-contractual 
recovery on such facts would not be appropriate, the law today is 
otherwise. The Restatement of Restitution, for example, intimates that 
plaintiff's recovery in quasi-contract does not require a showing that 
plaintiff's loss corresponds precisely to defendant's gain.133 The 
Washington Supreme Court embraced this view in Olwell u. Nye & 
Nissen Co.134 'The defendant had used the plaintiff's washing machine 
on an average of one day per week over a three year period.135 The 
plaintiff, who had placed the machine in storage, not intending to use 
it, brought an action in quasi-contract to recover the reasonable value 
of the machine's use. Although the machine was valued at only $600, 
the plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial court for more than 
$1500.136 '. The court measured the plaintiff's recovery by the 
defendant's "negative unjust enrichment," the amount defendant saved 
in wages paid by using the machine. The defendant argued that the 
plaintiff suffered no loss since he had not intended to use the 
machine.137 'Although the court did assert that a loss must be shown as 
a condition to recovery, 138 ' it defined loss so flexibly that the case 
stands for the proposition that plaintiff need suffer no demonstrable 
loss in order to recover in quasi-contract.139 Other courts also have 
Peters v. Halligan, 182 Neb. 51, 60,152 N.W.2d 103,109 (1967); Burke v. McKee, 304 P.2d 
307, 308-09 (Okla. 1956). 
132. W. KEENER, supra note 6, at 163; F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 274, at 
442. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 70, at 419; York, Extension of Restitutional Reme-
dies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 449, 504 (1957). 
133. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Introductory Note§§ 150·59, at 595·96 ( 1937). 
134. 26 Wash.2d282, 173 P.2d652 (1946). 
135. I d. at 283·84, 173 P .2d at 652-53. 
136. See id. at 287-88, 173 P .2d at 654-55. The appellate court reduced the amount of the 
judgment, not because it objected to the amount, but because the amount exceeded the 
sum plaintiff asked for in his complaint. I d. 
137. I d. at 285·86, 173 P .2d at 653-54. 
138. Id. 
139. See D. DoBBS, supra note 70, at 418. 
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rejected the notion that plaintiff's loss must be matched against a 
corresponding gain by defendant before an action in quasi-contract will 
lie.140 
The rejection of the Keener-Woodward plus-minus limitation has 
increased the yardsticks available to measure damage awards in unjust 
enrichment actions. As long as a plaintiff's recovery in quasi-contract 
could not exceed his loss, the range of alternatives available to a court 
in framing a damage award was limited; that standard effectively denies 
judges the right to measure plaintiff's recovery by defendant's profits, 
since the necessary link between defendant's profits and plaintiff's loss 
does not exist.141 Once a plaintiff's recovery can exceed the amount of 
his loss, courts become free to apply a variety of tests in the calculation 
of recovery. The case of Olwell v. Nye and Nissen Co. 142 provides a 
useful illustration. If the court had felt bound strictly by the 
Keener-Woodward plus-minus limitation, the plaintiff's recovery 
probably would not have been measured by the defendant's negative 
unjust enrichment.143 By abandoning the narrow limitation, the court 
in Olwell had a much 'vider range of alternatives available to assess 
plaintiff's award. Instead of granting plaintiff the net profits that the 
defendant earned by using the machine, the court properly could have 
measured recovery by looking to the expenses saved as measured by the 
rental value of the machine rather than by wages saved or by awarding 
plaintiff the fair market value of the machine. 
The decline of the Keener-Woodward plus-minus limitation illustrates 
the general tendency of courts to breach the doctrinal barriers that have 
been constructed to restrict recovery in quasi-contract. As courts have 
stretched the concept of benefit itself to apply quasi-contract principles 
to cases in which a particular result seemed just, they also have rejected 
the plus-minus distinction where its application would restrict recovery 
unjustly. In sweeping aside the artificial restraints of the plus-minus 
formula, however, the courts have eliminated almost all limitations on 
the calculation of damage awards in quasi-contract actions. The field 
appears open to wide-ranging judicial subjectivity in measuring a 
plaintiff's proper recovery. Since no firmly fixed standards guide either 
the definition of benefit or application of the plus-minus formula, the 
140. See, e.g., Catts v. Phalen, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 376, 381·82 (1844); Federal Sugar 
Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., 268 F. 575, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); 
Ablah v. Eyman, 188 Kan. 665, 677·80, 365 P.2d 181, 190·92 (1961). 
141. See F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 274, at 442. 
142. 26Wash.2d282, 173P.2d652 (1946). 
143. Cf. D. DoBBS, supra note 70, at 418 (under Keener-Woodward analysis recovery 
limited to value of converted goods; no consideration of defendant's profits). 
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risks of injustice and unpredictability are great.144 A meaningful 
attempt to reconcile and unify the law of quasi-contract must be 
grounded in concepts more legitimate and less artificial than the 
Keener-Woodward view that an action in quasi-contract will not lie 
unless an equivalent gain and loss are shown. 
CoNCLUSION 
No single comprehensive definition of benefit in quasi-contract is 
possible. However convenient a uniform definition might be, a fair 
reading of the cases that invoke quasi-contract principles shows that too 
few consistent conceptual threads exist to fashion a unifying definition. 
Several factors account for this conceptual discord. The divergent 
factual settings in which quasi-contract principles are invoked stretch 
across an extraordinarily broad range of legal categories. Actions 
grounded in quasi-contract serve as alternatives to proceedings in both 
tort and contract. In the contract category alone, quasi-contract 
principles may be utilized in cases having their origin in express 
contract and also in actions where no explicit consensual agreement 
between the parties exists. 
The varying attitudes of courts toward the idea of quasi-contract also 
complicates analysis. Some jurisdictions have embraced the principles 
underlying quasi-contract with genuine enthusiasm; others have shown 
hostility to application of a doctrine that sometimes violates the logical 
symmetry of more conventional legal rules. Inconsistencies also arise 
from variations in judicial attitudes toward plaintiffs. A court that 
perceives the plaintiff as a wrongdoer may deny recovery, even though 
the defendant has reaped an unjustified gain at plaintiff's expense. 
After determining that the defendant has benefitted and the plaintiff is 
without legal "sin," courts still confront the difficult task of measuring 
the defendant's gain. This tangled judicial environment produces a 
paradoxical treatment of the concept of benefit. Although that concept 
relates to the particular facts of the case in which it is being applied, 
courts often express the concept of benefit so generally that the 
definition becomes essentially meaningless as precedent. 
Impatient to reconcile or at least to explain seeming inconsistencies 
in conflicting cases, legal scholars tend to be uncomfortable with the 
144. Cf. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 IIARv. L. REv. 457 (1897) (predictability is cen-
tral to a rational legal system). 
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conceptual disorders inherent in quasi-contract. In the field of 
quasi-contract, theories have been advanced that actions arising in a 
contractual context should be distinguished from other applications of 
the doctrine. Such segmentation permits the development of generaliza· 
tions that are reasonably accurate within their self-defined limits but 
that do not apply across the whole range of quasi-contract actions; 
these generalizations are useful only in the sense that they illuminate 
the inherent haziness of quasi-contract principles. 
Quasi-contract owes its origin to the persistent desire to do justice; it 
saves a deserving plaintiff's claim from failure under conventional 
legal principles. Resort to quasi-contractual concepts often reflects a 
failure of such conventional principles to serve the ends of justice. The 
perception of what is just is by no means an objective vision and varies 
from generation to generation, from case to case, and from court to 
court. In fulfilling this ubiquitous impulse to do justice where legal 
logic has failed, quasi-contract has presented extraordinary difficulties 
to those who have sought to systematize and reconcile the distinctly 
unsystematic and conflicting cases that constitute the law of quasi· 
contract. The doctrine, in both its origin and its application, has proved 
itself immune to such attempts at organization. 
